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ABSTRACT 
This piece sketches ‘an’ economic sociology of law: one possible approach, in 
relation to one case study of wind farm development in Cyprus. Carbon 
emissions are a global threat to which wind farms may offer something of a 
solution. But wind farms can also pose local threats. So they tend to produce 
conflicts on different levels of social life: action, interaction, regime and 
rationality. As such they are ill-suited to exploration through law or economics, 
and ideally suited to exploration through economic sociology of law. The 
approach set out in this paper enables social life of all levels, intensities and 
types (including the economic) to be placed on the same analytical page. 
What emerges is a most human story of animosity, enthusiasm and apathy in 
which law acts variously as means, obstacle and irrelevance. 
PRELUDE 
Leave the Nicosia – Larnaca highway at the Kalo Chorio roundabout. Skirt the 
rolling hills crowned with unhurried blades. Proceed on crunching foot up the 
steepening slope, past the olive tree-shaded foxhole and the cobbled together 
fence. Scramble up the bright white, gravely path, dotted with scented 
crawlers, thistles and grasses dancing in the quickening breeze. Allow the 
inductive, robotic hum to draw you in. Detach, turn around and drink in the 
view. Descend in turmoil: animosity, enthusiasm, apathy?  
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AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 
The title of this piece promises ‘an’ economic sociology of law--it sketches but 
one possible approach, and showcases it in relation to a single case study: 
wind farm development in Cyprus.1 ‘At first sight the environmental benefits of 
generating energy from wind farms would seem to be overwhelming.’2 Carbon 
emissions are a global threat--economic, emotional and environmental, to 
which wind farms may offer something of a solution. But wind farms can also 
pose local threats—economic, emotional and environmental. So they tend to 
produce conflicts on ‘different scales’ of social life.3 As such they are ill-suited 
to exploration through law or economics, and ideally suited to exploration 
through economic sociology of law.  
A legal approach entails the ‘rationalisation of and speculation on the rules, 
principles, concepts and legal values considered to be explicitly or implicitly 
present in legal doctrine.’4 From this perspective, ‘law comes first and is the 
substantive focus. There is no need to look any further.’5 An economic 
approach might be said to be similarly constrained, entailing ‘rationalisations’ 
and ‘speculations’ regarding rules, principles, concepts and economic values 
thought to be present in human nature, and their impact on production, 
consumption and distribution.  
By contrast, and in keeping with its sociological roots, an economic sociology 
of law is outward looking. It conceptualises both the ‘legal’ and the ‘economic’ 
as social phenomena occurring on all, interconnected, levels of social life: 
                                            
1  Interviews and site visits were conducted in Cyprus in April 2012. Interviews are 
referred to by code, or not at all, to protect identity. Areas under Turkish occupation are not 
covered. 
2  S. Jackson ‘Wind Power: The legal and Environmental Issues’ (2005) ELFline at 4. 
3  J. Holder and M. Lee Environmental Protection, Law and Policy (2007 2nd ed) at 698. 
4  R. Cotterrell The Sociology of Law: An introduction (1992 2nd ed.) at 3. 
5  A. Perry-Kessaris ‘What does it mean to take a socio-legal approach to international 
economic law?’ in Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, context, 
subtext. (2012) at 4. 
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‘individual actors and their actions’, ‘interactions between actors’; ‘the 
institutions of social regimes’ into which interactions ‘aggregate’; and the 
‘rationalities’ that ‘underlie and direct social regimes’.6 These levels are 
analytically liberating because they elide boundaries imposed within the 
disciplines of economics (such as state, firm, household) and law (such as 
private or public, local or international), allowing us more effectively to capture 
messy reality. They are presented together, in stylised form, in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Actions, interactions, regimes and rationalities7 
 
© Amanda Perry-Kessaris. Designer Sarah Schrauwen. 
Social actions centre on widely divergent values and interests. This 
observation is illustrated in Figure 1 by reference to the human body using the 
Weberian typology of affective (heart), belief (head), traditional (foot) and 
                                            
6  S. Frerichs, ‘Re-embedding neo-liberal constitutionalism: a Polanyian case for the 
economic sociology of law’ in C. Joerges and J. Falke (eds.) Karl Polanyi, Globalisation and 
the Potential of Law in Transnational Markets (2011) at 68. Emphasis added. See also A. 
Perry-Kessaris ‘Reading the story of law and embeddedness through a community lens: a 
Polanyi-meets-Cotterrell economic sociology of law?’ (2011) 62(4) Northern Ireland Legal 
Quarterly 401 at 402. 
7  The diagram does not allude to the possibilities that parties perceive their 
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instrumental (hand). Most importantly for economic sociology of law, this 
image reminds us that economic activities (production, distribution and 
consumption) are just one sub-type of instrumental social action, intimately 
interconnected, through multi-layered and multi-tasking human beings, with 
other forms of social action (instrumental and otherwise).8  
Social interactions cover the full range of Weberian actions, and can be 
conceptualised as occurring at different intensities. This observation is 
captured in the lines that connect the actors in Figure 1. Broken lines indicate 
individualistic, superficial, impersonal interactions; solid lines indicate deep, 
stable and trusting relationships that Roger Cotterrell has termed ‘communal 
networks’.9 The dominant motivation, or underlying values and interests, of 
the interaction is suggested by the section of the body to which the line 
connects. 
Laws and other regimes are of sociological interest because they are part—
created, used, abused, avoided and destroyed in the course—of social life. So 
they appear in Figure 1 as part of social interactions: in the colouring of the 
lines that connect actors (black for Regime 1, grey for Regime 2). Law can 
trigger, facilitate or hinder all kinds of action and interaction, from 
individualistic to communal networks, in particular by supporting (or not) 
mutual inter-personal trust. It does this by expressing (or not) and 
coordinating between (or not) the often competing values and interests that 
are central to different social actions and interactions; and by facilitating and 
                                            
8  As Fred Block, citing Viviana Zelizer’s notion of ‘relational work’ notes, people have 
‘the capacity … to build and maintain powerful affective and reciprocal relations with each 
other even when commercial relationships and the rhetoric of self-interest are dominant.’ F. 
Block in this volume citing V. Zelizer, The Purchase of Intimacy (2006). 
9  R. Cotterrell Law, Culture and Society: Legal ideas in the mirror of social theory, 
Aldershot: Ashgate (2006) pp. 162-3 and in this volume. See also G. Walker ‘The role for 
“community” in carbon governance’ (2011) 2 Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change 
777. 
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encouraging (or not) participation in social life. It is also possible for law to 
undermine such networks.10 
Rationalities or ‘shared ways of apprehending the world’11 are of socio-legal 
interest to the extent that they influence and are influenced by socio-legal 
phenomena such as the creation, use, abuse, avoidance and destruction of 
laws. So they appear in Figure 1 as an overlay on regimes—black for 
Rationality 1 which is associated with Regime 1, grey for Rationality 2 which is 
associated with Regime 2.12  
What are the implications the unique capacity of economic sociology of law to 
integrate multiple social levels and perspectives in this way? The following 
sections set out in turn some of the econo-socio-legal phenomena that 
become visible when actors, rationalities and regimes, and interactions 
surrounding Cypriot wind farm development are placed on the same page. 
For the purposes of the present confined space special attention is paid to 
interplays between those levels of social life. What emerges is a most human 
story of animosity, enthusiasm and apathy in which law acts variously as 
means, obstacle and irrelevance. 
ACTORS 
This paper focuses on four sets of actors: developers, government actors, 
project-affected residents and civil society actors. All of these actors engage 
in instrumental interactions—resisting, assisting or acceding to the 
development of wind farms. But, as Figure 2 intimates, they are also likely to 
be acting on a combination of other motivations, centred on divergent values 
and interests. A developer might wonder: Will I maximise the return on my 
investment if I locate my wind turbine here? For the resident the questions 
                                            
10  See A. Perry-Kessaris Global Business, Local Law: The Indian Legal System as a 
communal resource in foreign investment relations (2008). 
11  J. A. Dryzek The Politics of the Earth: Environmental discourses (2005) at p. 9 and 
Part 3 
12  For complications arising when rationalities shift see Perry-Kessaris (2011) op. cit. n. 
6. 
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could be: Will the market value of my (or our) land fall (instrumental); and will 
my (or our) beloved view be ruined (affective)? A civil society actor might ask: 
Am I (or we) ethically bound to encourage residents to accept the turbine in 
order to protect others from the effects of climate change (belief). A 
government actor might ponder the cultural implications of a wind farm 
towering over an 18th Century mosque, built on the 649 burial site of the aunt 
of the Prophet Muhammed (traditional).  
Figure 2: Hala Sultan Tekke and the Alexigros wind farm 
 
© Amanda Perry-Kessaris. Photographer Nicos Kessaris. 
Of these actors in Cyprus only project-affected residents can be said to be 
engaged in stable, trusting ‘communal’ networks. Relations between 
developers, government actors and civil society actors are characterised by 
instability and distrust. 
The Government of Cyprus is, as one interviewee put it, akin to a small 
business: its executives are constrained by impossible demands for multi-
tasking and by the ego-bloating concentration of responsibilities. Most 
regulatory decisions on wind farms are taken by central government bodies, in 
particular the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Environment 
(MARE) and the Ministry of the Interior in the construction licensing phase; the 
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Cyprus Energy Regulatory Authority (CERA/PAEK) and the Transmission 
System Operator (TSO) in the production licensing and subsidy phase;13 and 
the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MCIT) for energy strategy. 
Relations within and between different levels and branches of government are 
often fractious: ‘It is a mess, it’s a mess …There are a lot of voices.’ 14 Local 
governance falls into two categories: 23 Municipalities, including the major 
towns; and 355 Community Councils.15 Their input into wind farm 
development is constrained primarily to planning issues arising during the 
construction licensing phase.16 Lines of communication between the local and 
central government are notoriously bad.17 
The wind farm developers of Cyprus are a motley crew. For some their wind 
farm is simply the latest in several decades of experiences in large-scale 
infrastructure development. For others it is a first foray beyond a career in 
retail or finance. Between 2003 and mid-2012 CERA received 51 applications 
for a license to construct wind farms and granted 35, of which 23 remain 
live.18 Developers were left to identify sites with the necessary amount of 
                                            
13  Established under Law 122 (1) /2003 on Regulating the Electricity Market, 
implementing Directive 2003/54/EC on common rules for the internal EU electricity market.  
14  Interview F23Y. For example, the MARE refused to take part in an energy policy 
review initiated the MCIT: TUV Rheinland Immissionsschutz und Energiesysteme GmbH and 
BGP Engineers B.V. (hereinafter TUV and BGP) Inception Report Provision of services for the 
preparation of a government strategy and action plan for exploiting the opportunities offered 
by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and European Emissions Trading Scheme (or 
others) for the periods 2008-2012 and 2013-2020 (2009) p. 11. In another case the Games 
Department objected that a wind farm application would interfere with bird flight—in fact 
they ‘didn’t want [the area] to be withdrawn from their territories’: Interview K26C. 
15  See Union of Cyprus Municipalities http://www.ucm.org.cy and Union of Cyprus 
Communities <http://www.ekk.org.cy> 
16  Governed by the Town and Country Planning Act of 1972, Law No. 90/72 as well as 
Local Plans and Area Schemes. 
17  Interviews T23C and A27C. 
18  Email communication with CERA Energy Officer 12.07.12.  
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wind, obtain permits related to construction (including planning, environmental 
and a long list of others) and operation (from CERA and the CEA), all in time 
for the, narrowly advertised and brief, opening of the application window for 
the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) Fund (should they wish to apply for it) 
described below.19 One developer reported in an interview that ‘If you ask me 
whether I would have done it again, no, never, no way. [You keep going 
because] you’re so much into it that you lost so much time and so much 
money you think well…and then at the end you feel like a fool.’ Another said ‘I 
didn’t know where I was going and whether I would succeed in the end or, you 
know, or I would get to the end of it...I felt I was just throwing money away.’ In 
the beginning, the developers formed a ‘very tight’ and ‘very vocal’ Cyprus 
Wind Energy Association.20 ‘We all had the same interest’ and there was a 
degree of ‘solidarity’. Today ‘everybody is pursuing his own interests.’ And 
when ‘some people choose the easy way…without care of environmental … 
or other issues… it is damaging for the rest.’21 
Cypriot civil society is ‘very young and very unprofessional’, but ‘getting 
stronger and more professional’.22 The term civil society has ‘only recently’ 
come to be used by media and politicians in Cyprus, and then often 
inaccurately—for example, to refer to the general electorate. Volunteer 
service-provision and labour association has a long history, but  ‘advocacy, 
dialogue and human rights groups’ are few, ‘nascent’ and generally ‘poor’ at 
‘influencing’ and enforcing public policy. The camaraderie and independence 
of civil society are threatened by their reliance on EU/US/Government of 
Cyprus patronage. Most civil society actors in Cyprus choose to conduct their 
advocacy activities through ‘clientelistic’ relations with political parties.23 This 
                                            
19  TUV and BGP op. cit. n. 13 p. 60. Interviews K23M and T23C. 
20  Interview T23C.  
21  Interviews K26C and F23Y. 
22  Interview D26J. 
23  M. Vasilara and G. Piaton ‘The Role of Civil Society in Cyprus’ (2007) 19:2 Cyprus 
Review 107 at 108, 112 and 116-7. A 2005 survey revealed 44 organisations covering 
environmental matters on the (un-occupied section of the) island: Bicommunal Development 
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may be because the Government has a history of systematically internalising 
private and civil society actors by, for example, co-opting them onto 
committees.24 For those who are not so internalised, ‘the Government does 
not know what consultation means, or take it seriously.’ One civil society actor 
remarked that is ‘only with the EU that they have introduced this constant 
jargon’ of consultation—‘they have to say they are doing this.’ But least ‘it 
gives us a space’ and ‘is moving the right direction—I say this very 
cautiously.’25 Also noteworthy is the Environment Commissioner, who creates 
an unusual bridge between government and governed by independently 
investigating and reporting on environmental matters to the President, while 
maintaining a daily blog and engaging in public protests.26  
DOWNLOADING RATIONALITIES AND REGIMES 
Two international regimes, and their associated rationalities, are implicated in 
the development of wind farms in Cyprus: the Kyoto climate change regime 
and the Aarhus participation regime. In order to understand their origin and 
interaction it is necessary to understand the island as, among other things a 
post-colony many times over, occupied most recently by the Ottoman and 
                                                                                                                             
Programme Cyprus Environmental Directory (2005). Available at 
http://mirror.undp.org/cyprus/endir/EnvDir_En_2005.pdf. 
24  For example, the Federation of Environmental and Ecological Organizations is an 
umbrella group of 18 NGOs covering consumption, chemistry, mountain climbing and wildlife 
and is on environmental committees. See http://www.oikologiafeeo.org and Cyprus 
Department of Environment, MARE, Republic of Cyprus (2011) National Implementation 
Report on Aarhus Convention. Generated at http://apps.unece.org/ehlm/pp/NIR/index.asp on 
03.04.12.  
25  Interview P25S. For example, it was reported that the when developing priorities for 
the EU Structural Fund the government only consulted the Pan-Cyprian Volunteerism 
Coordinative Council--‘service providers who know nothing of activism’ which is founded by 
statute and government-funded: Interview P25S. Law 61(1)/2006 on the Pancyprian 
Volunteerism Coordinative Council. 
26  For the Blog see http://theopemptou.blogspot.com. For public protest see: 
http://youtu.be/ogSzvx3TKb8.  
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then British empires, and now Turkey.27  It is only the third largest island in the 
Mediterranean, and it is divided into three spheres of governance. The 
northern third has been occupied by Turkey since 1974 and is governed by 
executive, legislative and judicial institutions under the title of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus. The Sovereign Base Areas of Dhekelia on the 
southwest coast and Akrotiri to the southeast remain British Overseas 
Territories governed by a military-civil Administration. The majority of the 
island is under the control of the Republic of Cyprus, including a President 
and Council of Ministers, an elected House of Representatives and a 
judiciary. 
After its 1960 independence from Britain, the developmental state of Cyprus 
was in many ways highly effective, shepherding in the ‘Cyprus Miracle’ of 
‘extraordinary’ recovery and growth following the invasion of ‘the more 
productive part’ of the island.28 Cyprus also immediately embarked on a 
journey of Europeanization, becoming a Member of the EU in 2004. Political 
scientists have referred to processes by which regimes (and rationalities) are 
transmitted between (candidate and member) states and the EU as 
‘downloading’ (from the EU to states), ‘cross-loading’ (between states), and 
‘uploading’ (from states to the EU). This terminology is echoed in Niall 
Ferguson’s nattily branded ‘six killer apps of western civilization’.29 The 
sociological elephant in the room is that these ‘apps’ are socially constructed, 
inherently open source and, as such, subject to what Halliday and Carruthers 
have called ‘recursive cycles’ of national and international social and legal 
change.30 So they get used, abused and avoided; to positive, negative and no 
effect; as part of the actions and interactions of social life. That is the stuff of 
economic sociology of law. 
                                            
27  See W. Mallinson Cyprus: A Modern History (2009). 
28  D. Christodoulou Inside the Cyprus Miracle: the labours of an embattled mini-
economy (1992) and Interview A27C. 
29  N. Ferguson Civilisation: The six killer apps of Western power (2012). 
30  T. C. Halliday and B. G. Carruthers Bankrupt: Global law-making and systemic 
financial crisis (2009). 
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The prevailing direction, accuracy, speed and so on of Europeanization in a 
given state is governed by what Sepos terms ‘territorial’ and ‘temporal’ 
attributes. Cyprus can be categorised as ‘territorially’ small, southern, and 
peripheral. On the ‘temporal’ dimension, Cyprus is a late joiner to the EU; like 
other predominantly agrarian, orthodox and Catholic societies, relatively slow 
to ‘reform its traditions’; and like many other post-colonial states, ‘bears the 
imprint and legacy’ of its Ottoman and British colonisers, and has suffered 
from ‘ethnic conflict, civil war, political turmoil and divisions’.31  
Like other post-colonial, small, southern, peripheral states, Cyprus is 
‘characterized by anticipatory, adaptive and “downloading” Europeanization’. 
It tends to ‘policy-taker’ not ‘maker’.32 Social anthropologist Vassos Argyrou 
has directly linked this tendency to the dominance of a post-colonial 
rationality, proposing that post-independence Cyprus has been ‘ruled’ by ‘the 
idea of Europe.’ As a post colony, ‘the best [it] could ever hope for was to 
modernise’—in this case, to ‘de-Ottomanise’ and to ‘become like Europe—
similar, but never quite the same.’ He mocks the idea of the so-called 
‘decision’ of Cyprus to join the EU: neither was Europe sure it wanted Cyprus, 
nor was there serious debate as to whether Cyprus wanted Europe, especially 
as compared to any other team. So there was no hesitation or debate when 
Cyprus was asked to drop involvement in the Third Worldly Non-Aligned 
Movement, of which it was a founding member, as a condition of entry to the 
First Worldly EU. The downloading of European regimes has, aside from 
religious objections to homosexuality civil marriage, been fairly automatic. 
What citizens elsewhere in Europe ‘experience as an imposition’, Cypriots 
‘experience as natural and necessary’, so much so that ‘the most effective 
way to legitimise new legislation’ is to suggest that the EU requires it.33 
                                            
31  A. Sepos The Europeanization of Cyprus (2008) pp. 6-14. 
32  Id. pp. 9 and 10. 
33  V. Argyrou ‘Independent Cyprus? Postcoloniality and the spectre of Europe’ 2021 
22:2 The Cyprus Review 39 at 41-3. This is phenomenon is widely observed: See P. M. Hass 
‘Compliance with EU directives: insights from international relations and comparative politics’ 
(1998) 5:1 Journal of European Public Policy 17. 
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Accordingly, in a 2011 Eurobarometer survey of Cyprus 95 per cent of 
interviewees agreed that EU law ‘is necessary’ to protect the environment in 
Cyprus, and 81 per cent that the Government’s should make environmental 
decisions jointly with the EU.34 
Two regimes downloaded by Europeanizing Cyprus are central to the 
development of wind farms on the island: the Clean Development Mechanism 
of the Kyoto climate change regime and, to a lesser extent, the Aarhus 
Convention participation regime. In his highly influential taxonomy of the 
Politics of the Earth, John Dryzek identified three ‘environmental discourses’ 
or rationalities that dominate ‘environmental problem solving’ regimes. They 
are all ‘prosaic and reformist’ (operating within the confines of industrial 
market society), not revolutionary. Dryzek dubs them ‘administrative 
rationalism’, which privileges ‘experts’ and produces expert-based regimes; 
‘economic rationalism’, which privileges ‘markets’ and produces market-based 
regimes; and ‘democratic pragmatism’, which privileges ‘people’ and produces 
participation-based regimes.35 Elements of each of these rationality-regimes 
have played a part in wind farm development in Cyprus.  
KYOTO: ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALISM  
Under the 1998 Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNCCC), richer Parties (listed in Annex I) are allocated an 
emissions target in the form of tradable Assigned Amount Units (AAU).36 In 
addition, developers of emissions-reducing projects, such as wind farms, that 
are hosted in poorer (‘non-Annex I’) states and are registered under the 
UNCCC Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) can earn tradable 
Certificates of Emissions Reduction (CERs or ‘project offsets’ or ‘carbon 
credits’) each representing 1 tonne of Co2 emissions avoided. So Parties can 
produce emissions to the level of their assigned (and any purchased) Amount 
                                            
34  European Commission Eurobarometer Survey: Attitudes of European Citizens 
Towards the Environment, Cyprus Factsheet (2011a).  
35  Dryzek op. cit. n.10 p. 9 and Part 3. 
36  Articles 10 and 2.2.  
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Units and CERs.37 In the taxonomy developed by Dryzek, the carbon market 
element of the Kyoto regime can be described as market-based, grounded in 
economic-rationalism. 
The Protocol was downloaded into EU law in 2002.38 EU Member States 
committed from the outset jointly to fulfil their Kyoto obligations, and the 
Treaties under which Cyprus and others joined the EU in 2004 included 
national targets for production from renewable energy sources to ensure 
those obligations were realised.39 Instead of targets, the EU caps emissions 
from member states, power stations and plants across the EU. It allows 
under-shooters to trade certified emissions reductions to over-shooters. The 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETC) is ‘largely parasitic upon’ the global carbon 
market created by Kyoto because it recognises the CERs derived from CDM 
projects.40 
In Dryzek’s taxonomy, the CDM project registration element of the Protocol 
regime (upon which this paper focuses) can be described as expert-based, 
grounded in administrative rationalism. It relies heavily on ‘a certain idea of 
bureaucracy’ and on ‘assumptions’ that ‘at each step of the process’ success 
will be achieved by ‘appropriate ordering.’ Applying the lens of Actor Network 
Theory, Emilie Cloatre has described the CDM as ‘hybrid socio-legal and 
technical solution’ produced by lawyers, state negotiators and UN officials 
(‘administrator-sociologists’) in partial fulfilment of the ‘actor-world’ (vision of 
the type of society into which the CDM solution would fit) that they generated 
at Kyoto. That world was to include developers and engineers with Project 
Design Documents detailing how CDM registration will enable the production 
of new ‘clean’ energy (‘additionality’) and contribute to ‘sustainable 
                                            
37  Article 12. 
38  Council Decision 2002/358/EC. 
39  Initially six per cent by 2010: Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of 
energy from renewable sources. 
40  J. Scott ‘In legal limbo: post-legislative guidance as a challenge for European 
administrative law’ (2011) 48 Common Market Law Review 329 at p. 332. See Directive 
2004/101 OJ (2004) L 338/61. 
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development’. Projects would be approved by the Designated National 
Authority (a government body), validated by a UN-approved commercial 
auditing company (Designated Operational Entity (DOE), registered by the 
CDM Executive Board in Bonn, implemented (including technology transfer, 
capacity building and sustainable development) by engineers, monitored by 
validators and converted into CERs.41 Significantly, the CDM actor world did 
not explicitly include project-affected residents or civil society.  
For reasons unclear, but resonating with post-coloniality, Cyprus was 
originally listed as a non-Annex I Party, eligible to host CDM projects. It was 
not agreed until 2011 that it might join the rest of the EU in Annex I—and then 
not because Cyprus could no longer pretend to be a developing country, but 
in order to put it on the ‘same legal footing as other Member States’; and not 
before 2013, so as to ensure ‘smooth transition’ and ‘avoid implications’ for 
issuing CERs for CDM project reductions achieved to that point.42 The EU 
recognises the problem, and is beginning to upload a number of quality 
controls to the CDM regime, starting with a campaign to limit CDM projects to 
least developed countries (LDCs)–that is, not Cyprus, Brazil, China and India; 
and a refusal to allow to be traded on the ETS any CERs emanating from 
non-LDC CDM projects that are registered after 2013, in the absence of a 
specific agreement.43 Meanwhile, six Cypriot wind projects have obtained 
CDM registration: Alexigros, Orites, Agia Anna, Kambi, Klavdia and Mari, of 
which the first three are operational. 
                                            
41  E. Cloatre ‘A socio-legal analysis of an actor-world: The case of carbon trading and 
the clean development mechanism’ (2012) 39:1 Journal of Law and Society 76 at pp. 77-8 
and 82. 
42  Secretariat of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (2011) Document 
DBO/JBU/smb/Log 11-2075 available at 
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/03.pdf.  
43  J. Scott and L. Rajamani ‘EU climate change unilateralism’ (2012) 23:2 European 
Journal of International Law 469 at p. 471. See also European Commission (2011b) 
‘Questions and answers on the use of international credits in the third trading phase of the 
EU ETS’ Available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/news/articles/news_2011111401_en.htm. 
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The following sections explore three mismatches between on the one hand, 
the actor-world envisaged during the construction of the Kyoto rationality-
regime; and on the other hand, actors and interactions in Cyprus. The first two 
mismatches relate primarily to the ‘additionality’ requirement, the third relates 
the ‘sustainable development’ requirement.  
1. Apathy and in-expertise  
The Kyoto rationality-regime relies on the existence of enthusiastic experts 
who are largely absent in Cyprus. As one developer put it, the government 
‘was the most important factor regarding the success’ of wind farms but they 
‘didn’t know what they were doing’ and ‘were expecting us to do it for them…It 
was very confusing.’ Another observed ‘a lack of willingness to take a 
decision—you would rather that they just say no—or yes.’44 This gap between 
international theory and local reality has two important effects.  
First, in Cyprus as elsewhere, the Clean Development Mechanism appears to 
have inadvertently supported projects that would, thanks to local government 
support, have been financially viable without it.45 The government has twice 
(in 2003 and 2009) committed to support a limited amount of wind energy by 
guaranteeing to pay a particular ‘feed-in tariff’ per unit of electricity supplied by 
a limited number of wind farms for a specified period.46 That tariff is made up 
of the price normally paid by the Electricity Authority of Cyprus (EAC) for non-
renewable energy (determined by global energy prices),47 supplemented with 
a contribution from the consumer-funded RES Fund.48 The 2003 tariff was 
low, so the credibility and CER revenue offered by CDM registration were 
                                            
44  Interviews K26C, T25S and F23Y. 
45  Cloatre p. cit. n. 40 p. 88. 
46  Law 33(I)/2003 on energy conservation and the promotion of renewable energy 
sources, implementing Directive 2001/77/EC on the promotion of electricity produced from 
Renewable Energy Sources in the internal electricity market. 
47  At the time of writing, about 0.1542 Euros/kwh. 
48  A levy of 0.22 Euro-cent/kWh is charged on all electricity consumption under Law 
33(I)/2003.  
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crucial to convincing investors of the financial viability of the project: CDM 
registration would indeed result in the production of ‘additional’ clean energy. 
When EU renewable energy targets were raised in 2009 (to 13 per cent by 
2020) clean energy ‘became important for the government’ and the 
government responded with a generous rise in the feed-in tariff. 49 Several 
projects were thereby rendered ‘economically viable’ so that ‘additionality’ 
could ‘most probably no longer [be] proven.’ Nevertheless they were CDM-
validated and registered, prompting several developers to query the expertise 
of validators in Cyprus: They ‘had no idea, but they were licensed for it.’50 And 
‘the thing is that at the United Nations, once there is a stamp from a 
validator…’51  
The second effect of the lack of expertise on the island is that the void where 
public sector expertise ought to be has been filled by market ‘expertise’. So a 
rationality-regime grounded in administrative rationalism is in fact being 
guided by economic rationalism. Developers of any project applying for CDM 
registration are responsible for commissioning the validation of their project by 
an approved private company (DOE). That system has been found to be open 
to abuse by validators and the developers who employ them.52  
In Cyprus, the involvement of economic rationality went much further as, due 
to government apathy and in-expertise, developers were allowed to co-create 
the overarching regulatory framework, in addition to commissioning and 
paying for the environmental impact assessments and public consultations 
associated with their individual projects. The first Cypriot project to apply for 
CDM registration, and to navigate the Cypriot regulatory system, was the Mari 
                                            
49  Interviews T25S and K26C. Directive 2009/28/EC. The feed-in tariff was raised by 26 
per cent in 2009 as compared to 2003. 
50  Interview T26S and TUV and BGP op. cit. n. 13. The feed-in tariff was 0.092 
Euros/KWH in 2003, rising to 0.166 Euros/KWH in 2009. 
51  Cyprus report under Directive 2009/28/EC on progress in the use and promotion of 
energy from renewable sources, 2011. Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/reports/2011_en.htm> 
52  Cloatre op. cit n. 40 pp. 86-7. 
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project in Larnaca--a Cypriot-German joint venture initiated in 1996. The 
developers ‘[n]ot only lobbied’ but ‘trained the whole of the Town Planning 
Board’, funding their 1999-2000 tour of German wind farms and planning 
departments, providing bespoke translations of German regulations. The ‘very 
specific reason’ was to prevent the transplantation of the ‘absolutely 
atrocious…very, very strict’ English regulations on wind farm location. In other 
cases residents were taken to Germany, and officials were taken to Greece: 
these were, in the words of one developer ‘a huge investment of time and 
money.’ This piece of the wind farm legislative puzzle—the desired ‘German 
philosophy in common law drafting’--was finally implemented in 2006.53 
Similarly, an environmental adviser working for developers reported that he 
‘started from scratch’: 
‘The rules were created along the way….Having done the first one and 
improved the second one then more or less our table of contents 
became a standard…I remember meetings with the town planning 
people [in central government] who were asking us for information and 
references so that they could come up with certain guidelines for future 
investors.’  
As he delights in reminding regulators, they have neither the skill nor the 
inclination to verify what they are being told by those applying for licenses. But 
if the borrowers, the lenders and the Executive Board of the CDM ‘have 
satisfied themselves that it will work...why should anybody else be worried?’54 
Apparently those who ought to be are not. 
2. Animosity 
Relations between wind farm developers and government actors have been 
very much ‘“them” and “us”’.55 This is sociologically significant because it has 
contributed to the above-noted frustration and fractiousness among 
                                            
53  Interview TP25S. See also RES Planning Law 162(1)/2006.  
54  Interview F23Y. Likewise a Belgian firm was hired as a consultant MCIT after acting 
as co-participant in a CDM application: Kambi PDD p. 23. 
55  Interview F23Y. 
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developers, and because it constitutes in a further warping of the actor-world 
envisaged at Kyoto. In a further twist, the CDM registration process treats 
animosity from governments (and the general population) as evidence of 
additionality: without the credibility of the CDM, the project (and resulting 
clean energy) with not materialise. 
There is evidence of government animosity towards wind farm developers 
generally. In 2009 the CERA undermined the worth of CDM registration by 
including a clause in RES Fund contracts to say that income derived by RES-
Funded producers from CERS ‘without approval of the Fund shall be 
deducted from the Subsidy Payments to be made to the producer.’56 One 
developer retorted that the clause was arbitrary and ‘illegal’ so that the 
‘government will be in…big trouble if any of us go to court’.57 Some 
developers have responded by diverting CER rights to special purpose 
companies58 or third parties. Moreover ‘it is too much hassle and expense to 
go through the monitoring (or the initial validation process) with the Cyprus 
authorities to get them to issue the CERs.’ So some have not bothered to 
apply, and are in breach of their obligations to the third parties, to whom they 
are paying compensation.59  
There has also been a degree of animosity in the implementation of 
provisions designed to ensure that developers offer benefits to project-
effected residents.60 Following a tradition built up in relation to quarries, two 
                                            
56  TUV and BGP op. cit. n.13 at p. 11. 
57  Id. at p. 58. 
58  Orites PDD p. 3 and Interview P26C. 
59  Interview TS27. 
60  Such provisions have been found to have positive socio-psychological effects on 
project-affected residents in other countries: C. R. Warren and M. McFadyen ‘Does 
community ownership affect public attitudes to wind energy?’ A case study from south-west 
Scotland’ (2010) Land Use Policy 204. But some regard them as bribes: N. Cass et al. ‘Good 
neighbours, public relations and bribes: The politics and perceptions of community benefit 
provision in renewable energy development in the UK’ (2010) 12:3 Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning 255 at p. 269. 
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per cent of revenue for electricity generated by a project is automatically 
withheld from developers for distribution to the community hosting it. This can 
work out to a sizeable amount, about 200,000 Euros per year for a large wind 
farm, upon which the community or municipality can then draw as seed 
funding for other development projects. ‘But the Government has yet to 
establish a mechanism for dispersing the funds’--whether because they ‘are 
trying to avoid’ giving money to local communities where ‘there is no 
transparency and everything works in a very sort of funny sort of way’, or 
because they simply ‘don’t know how to divide it.’61 Significantly, the 
Government does not seek to correct the impression in the press that it is the 
developers who are at fault. One developer is working together with the local 
community leader to press the government to release the funds.62  
Finally there are reports of animosity towards particular developers--of 
applications for construction licenses being rejected, only to be passed when 
presented by another developer. Some also suggested that life is harder for 
foreign developers: ‘There is no way’ that a foreign company can invest in 
Cyprus ‘on their own’. ‘It’s one of these places in order to do anything you 
need to have someone from that – from the country to, sort of, lead you by the 
hand.’63  
The CDM regime does much to reward applicant developers for finding fault 
with local (public and private) expertise and attitudes. Developers are invited 
to identify in their Project Design Documents any ‘barriers’ that would ‘prevent’ 
the implementation of the proposed project activity in the absence of CDM 
registration. Developers gladly accept, often quoting each other verbatim. 
Exhibit A is the fact that ‘Cyprus is not very famous for its winds’64 which are 
                                            
61  Interviews PC25 and KM25. 
62  Developers pay a construction fee that goes to local communities for use in projects, 
such as a school: Interview K26C. 
63  Interviews T25S and P25C. 
64  Interview K26C. 
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‘not that favourable’ and lead to projects of ‘limited efficiency’,65 that are 
‘financially unattractive to investors.’66 To be clear, that is treated as a point in 
favour of registration. Exhibit B is the ‘void’ where local Cypriot wind energy 
technological expertise ought to be.67 Maximum emphasis is placed on Exhibit 
C: the failures of the Government of Cyprus to implement ‘regulation and 
process definitions’. Construction phase laws were ‘not enacted’, available 
only as ‘guiding principles’, and required ‘more than 30 licenses’. The ‘lack of 
experience’ among government actors ‘in dealing with wind farm applications 
and preparing contracts imposed additional delays.’68 Detailed timelines are 
presented revealing years of delays between costly license applications being 
made and approvals being given.69  
Returning to the theme of expertise, developers are being prompted to draw 
on their market-expertise to turn the absence of expertise on which 
administrative rationality-regimes rely into an economic advantage. 
3. Sustainable development 
CDM registration will not be given unless the host country is willing to ‘confirm 
that it will contribute to “sustainable development”’. This wrongly implies that 
this term bears some sort of globally-shared technical meaning.70 Worse still, 
the CDM regime makes no enquiry into whether such an understanding has 
                                            
65  Klavdia PDD pp. 29 and 30 and Kambi PDD p. 23. Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int. 
66  Agia Anna PDD p. 13. Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int 
67  For example, Kambi PDD p. 22. Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int. 
68  Alexigros PDD p.9, Orites PDD p. 16 and Klavdia PDD p. 19. Available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int 
69  Klavdia PDD pp. 19-20. Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int. 
70  On the many meanings of sustainable development see S. Bell and D. McGillivary 
Environmental Law (2008 7th ed.) ch. 3. In a 2008 opinion survey in Cyprus about a third (35 
per cent) of interviewees reported never having heard of the term ‘sustainable development’. 
RAI Consultants ‘Report on a Quantitative Survey on Perceptions on Sustainable Development 
and Climate Change in Cyprus’ (2008) Prepared for AKTI and CESF in cooperation with UNDP. 
Available at http://akti.org.cy/turkish/AKTI_report_2008(f).ppt. 
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been arrived at locally in relation to a given project, for example by requiring 
proof of substantive public participation in the awarding of planning approval. 
So the CDM excludes almost entirely the expertise of project-affected 
residents. 
Yet it is at the local level that multiple interpretations of ‘sustainable 
development’--as economic growth with emissions reduction, as conservation, 
and/or as improvement to the lives of the relatively poor--come into conflict. 
The CDM regime simply black-boxes participation, accepting the word of 
validator and the government in question that it has occurred, was fulsome 
and resulted in any necessary change. A typical validation document reads:  
‘Relevant stakeholders have been informed five times (one time during 
the EIA process, two times during the town planning permit process, 
two times during the licencing process by the [CERA]) by newspaper 
announcements; further on the [involved community] has been directly 
addressed. No negative comments have been received. All meetings 
are documented.’ 
When specific concerns are raised in Iocal proceedings, the project design 
document will assert, for example, that ‘the issues of aesthetics and noise 
have been dealt with’ in the environmental impact assessment commissioned 
by the developer ‘and the conclusion can be extracted that no negative 
consequences exist.’71 As the next section reveals, that never quite all there is 
to it.  
AARHUS: DEMOCRATIC PRAGMATISM  
The second relevant regime downloaded by Europeanizing Cyprus is the 
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters of 1998. The concept 
of ‘participation has a very strong pull on environmental policy making, but its 
meaning and aims are rarely made clear.’ At an international level, the idea of 
public participation—that is, evaluation, comment and influence in relation to 
                                            
71  Orites CDM PDD p. 32. Available at http://cdm.unfccc.int. But see 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DKtmAWvSxpU. 
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regulatory decisions on policies or projects72--rose to prominence with 
Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on the Environment and 
Development. It was then elaborated in the three pillars of the Aarhus regime.  
Cypriot law has been in formal compliance with the first Aarhus pillar, access 
to environmental information, since 2004, and the second Aarhus pillar--public 
participation in decisions on projects, plans and programmes--since 2005.73  
Ex ante public participation occurs as part of the planning application process. 
In theory, any concerns raised at such meetings must be addressed before a 
license will be given.74 ‘Every single department is present’-- about 15 to 20 
voices—even though they have already expressed their views to the planning 
authority, and ‘if somebody objects then it has to be reviewed again.’75 The 
EU has not yet downloaded the third pillar, access to environmental justice, 
which is directed primarily towards ex-post facto solutions, but Cyprus 
appears to be formally compliant, thanks in large part to a judicial review 
gateway via Article 146 of the Constitution which allows complaints to the 
Supreme Court against an administrative act or omission alleged to be 
unconstitutional, illegal or an abuse of powers; and directly and adversely 
affecting legitimate interests of the complainant ‘as a person or as a member 
                                            
72  M. Lee and C. Abbott (2003) ‘The usual suspects: Public participation under the 
Aarhus Convention’ 66 Modern Law Review 80 at 82 and 86. 
73  Law No. 125(I)/2000 on Free Public Access to Information Relating to Environmental 
Issues; Law No. 119(I)/2004 on Public Access to Environmental Information implementing 
Directive 2003/04/EC; Law 140(I)/2005 on the Assessment of the Impacts on the 
Environment from Certain Projects; and Law 102(I)/2005 on the Assessment of the Impacts 
on the Environment from Certain Plans and Programmes. Member States decide whether to 
require an EIA for wind farms: Directive 85/337/EEC Article 4(2) and Annex II; and Cyprus 
requires one for projects of more than 1 MW: Environmental Impact Assessment of Certain 
Works, Law 140(I)/2005 (as amended by Law 42(1)/2007) Article 31, Appendix I. 
74  One project allegedly obtained an environmental permit without the agreement of 
the local community. The matter is being heard in court. Interview K26C. 
75  Interviews K25M and F23Y. 
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of a Community’.76 This is not quite a gateway to the kind of ‘quintessentially 
communal’ public interest litigation enjoyed in India77 because Article 2 
specifies that the term ‘Community’ which threads through the Constitution of 
Cyprus refers specifically to the Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot Community 
of which Cypriots are a member by birth or later choice. Legal persons 
‘created with the purpose of promoting environmental protection’ are, since 
2005, ‘considered to have sufficient interests that may be affected by a 
decision’ and therefore entitled to launch a judicial review.78 But as we shall 
see below, that entitlement has not been exercised. 
Each of these pillars (two of which were downloaded into EU Directives) might 
be seen as a ‘hybrid socio-legal and technical solution’, akin to the CDM, in 
partial fulfilment of the ‘actor world’ generated at Aarhus. In Dryzek’s 
taxonomy the Aarhus regime can be described as primarily people-based, 
grounded in democratic pragmatism. So the actor world was imagined to 
include individuals and civil society actors with an interest in information, 
participation and justice.79 
1. Apathy 
‘[P]erhaps the most significant innovation’ of the Aarhus regime and the actor 
world it generated is ‘the distinct role’ envisaged for civil society actors80--that 
is, ‘non-state actors whose aims are neither to generate profits nor to seek 
                                            
76  Any ‘directly affected’ person or organisation may complain to the Ombudsman that 
an administrative decision ‘violates human rights’ or the law of ‘proper administration’. But 
one civil society actor observed that ‘it takes too long’ and is pointless it ‘is not binding’: 
Interview P25S. See: s. 5(1)(a) and s. 6 Commissioner for Administration Law 3/1991  and 
http://www.ombudsman.gov.cy. 
77  Perry-Kessaris (2008) op. cit. n. 9 pp. 112-3. 
78  Law 140(I)/2005. Department of Environment (2011). 
79  It is also expert-based, grounded in administrative rationalism, imagined to be 
populated by judicial and bureaucratic actors with the necessary expertise to facilitate (or not 
obstruct) them. 
80  Lee and Abbot op. cit. n. 75 at p. 87. 
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governing power’; and who ‘unite people to advance shared goals and 
interests.’81 In particular where (as seems to be the case in Cyprus) gateways 
to participation are generally unknown, misunderstood, and even undesired, 
civil society is key to the success of democratic rationality-regimes. So the 
emphasis on civil society actors raises all sorts of concerns about their 
representativeness and independence,82 as well as their abilities.  
As might be expected, there has been some government apathy towards the 
first Aarhus pillar, access to environmental information: ‘Trying to get 
[information] out of the Government is like getting the proverbial blood out of a 
stone.’83 More remarkable are the demand-side constraints.  
First, in relation to access to information, the Department of Environment 
reported in 2011 that ‘[m]ost’ information requests are made by consultants 
and students. Members of the public only becoming ‘involved …when they are 
directly affected’ by a project, not as civil society actors.84 
In relation to the second Aarhus pillar, public participation, it is revealing that 
only 36 per cent of interviewees in a 2008 opinion survey in Cyprus were 
aware of a law protecting citizens’ participation in environmental decision-
making processes; and most (60 per cent) reported that citizens are not 
usually consulted in the decision making process on environmental matters. 
Moreover, there was only limited enthusiasm for the idea that decisions 
regarding environmental sustainability should be taken by the local community 
(11 per cent of interviewees) rather than the EU (29 per cent) level or the 
                                            
81  UNDP (2001) ‘UNDP and Civil Society Organisations: A policy of engagement’. New 
York: UNDP. Available at 
http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/ourwork/partners/civil_society_organizations.  
82  Lee and Abbot op. cit. n. 75 at p. 87. 
83  For example, the Cyprus Council of Ministers has had to specifically direct local 
authorities to make information available for a reasonable fee, not to treat planning 
applications as private, not to insist that members of the public themselves identify plot 
numbers: Interview T28C. 
84  European Commission (2011a) op. cit. n. 33. 
A. Perry-Kessaris Anemos-ity, apatheia, enthousiasmos: An economic sociology of law and wind farm 
development in Cyprus (40:1) Journal of Law and Society Special Issue 2013 
 25 
state (38 per cent).85 Perhaps as a result, proceedings including an element 
of public participation are reportedly dominated by developers and 
government actors.  
The CDM Project Design Documents of some Cyprus wind projects refer to 
‘public hearings’ and ‘public consultation’86 but developers and their advisers 
in Cyprus were adamant:  
‘It’s not a public hearing.  It’s not a public hearing. They just gather 
these different government departments in one meeting room, and they 
discuss, everybody says their opinion, basically.  If you know 
somebody you can influence you, you know…And depending on this, 
you know…[For some bigger projects they hire a room in a hotel. But in 
others it is] only the closed sort of, dark room with about 10 people 
around [the developer]… It’s crazy, I mean, it is not a very transparent 
way of doing things’.87  
By all accounts proceedings are commonly dominated by central government 
and developers—others in attendances are usually one-shot players without 
experience.88 A major missing factor is civil society. 
In relation to the third pillar of access to justice, civil society actors have not 
availed themselves of the judicial review gateway offered by Article 142 of the 
Constitution, perhaps because they reportedly have ‘no faith in the courts at 
all. Zero.’ They feel they ‘will not get justice there.’89 
                                            
85  RAI Consultants (2008) op. cit. n. 69. 
86  Alexigros PDD p. 24, Kambi PDD p. 36, Klavdia PDD p. 48. Available at 
http://cdm.unfccc.int. 
87  Interview K26C. 
88  Interview F23Y. 
89  Interview P25S. Developers also claim reason to be wary, but one has reportedly 
filed a 146 claim against the Paphos District Officer in relation to a permitting error: 
Interviews KM25 and PC25. 
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2. Animosity 
Social-psychological studies have shown that residents can form ‘positive 
emotional’—in Weberian terms, affective and traditional—‘links’ with a 
location. These links may be ‘disrupted’ by wind farm (and other) 
developments, resulting in feelings of ‘anxiety and even grief’ both for the 
direct loss of the loved location, and for the consequential loss of any ‘sense 
of self or identity’ bound up in the location.90 It is true that 100 per cent of 
interviewees in a 2011 Eurobarometer survey of Cyprus agreed that 
‘protecting the environment’ was ‘important’ to them ‘personally’, and half 
included ‘climate change’ as one of the ‘five main environmental issues’ they 
‘worried about’.91 There are also those who find wind farms ‘quite attractive… 
fascinating…as a piece of modern art’.92 Some developers have been able to 
identify residents who are naturally apathetic, or even enthusiastic, about 
having a wind farm nearby.93 One developer remarked on the fact that many 
wind farms have been built on ‘refugee’ land--formerly Turkish Cypriot villages 
now inhabited by Greek Cypriot refugees from the North. ‘They were very, 
let’s say, calm in their approach.’ They were ‘the most sceptical’ but ‘did not 
raise a lot of objections.’94 Likewise, residents of ‘remote’ locations with little 
pre-existing economic activity reacted ‘positively’ because they saw the value 
of their land increasing or because they enjoyed the fact that ‘suddenly people 
started going and coming, they showed interest.’95 But behind every wind 
                                            
90  N. Cass and G. Walker ‘Emotion and rationality: The characterization and evaluation 
of opposition to renewable energy projects’ (2009) 2 Emotion, Space and Society 62 at p. 63. 
91  European Commission op. cit. n. 33.   
92  Interview A27C.   
93  Interviews A27C and K26C. Other have built on government land, or bought land. 
There has been no compulsory purchase.  
94  In Mari residents invited an independent specialist and a Member of Parliament to 
‘adjudicate’. Mari PDD p. 23, available at http://cdm.unfccc.int, and Interview K25M. 
95  Interview K26C. 
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farm in Cyprus lie the wrecks of proposals foiled by the animosity of project-
affected residents.96  
Equally, buried beneath every existing wind farm are the remains of animosity 
that has been manipulated—marketed--away. One developer reported picking 
off residents one by one, getting them to rent their land to the project, and 
then relying on them to ‘lobby’ their neighbours-- ‘So they will be working … 
on our side.’ The planning approval process is then less of a ‘bother’ because 
owners have already consented.97 Another reported making surreptitious 
payments to just one of several affected communities so that the project as a 
whole might proceed. 
The lack of an active civil society through which to pool energy, ideas and 
information, also means that discussion is limited, disjointed, unsophisticated 
and muted. Animosity (and enthusiasm) remain largely individual experiences. 
Developers are left as the only repeat players, able to dismiss or quash 
objections, and to define the terms of the debate. Residents, just like the 
government: 
‘depended, mostly, on the effort [developers] made to inform them… If I 
make the effort and come and find you and explain … the rationale 
behind why I want to promote this, and nobody else came to tell you 
the other side of the story, then you would be influenced by my way of 
presenting things or ideas.  And … there was no [other] serious 
approach. It’s sad, to be honest, in many ways, because you would 
expect that, you know, in the government and the civil side, they would 
be approaching the thing more maturely.’98  
One environmental expert noted an interplay between public fear and 
government lack of expertise, suggesting that ‘fear of windfarms’ exists in part 
because people don’t trust the authorities—and with ‘good reason’. ‘There is a 
                                            
96  England and Wales reportedly have a 60 per cent refusal rate for onshore windfarm 
applications. N. Cass, et al. op. cit. n. 59. 
97  Interview F23Y. 
98  Interview K26C. 
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small paragraph’ in environmental assessments ‘which nobody reads: 
“provided all the rules and regulations are followed.”’ Environmental 
inspectors are too few and poorly qualified ‘to check that the terms of the 
licence are actually adhered to.’99 In short, the experts are the market.  
3. Expertise and ‘expertise’ 
Expert-based regimes, such as the CDM registration process, tend to 
privilege ‘expertise based in scientific and economic rationalities’ that are 
most closely associated with instrumental values and interests. They tend to 
leave little or no space for ‘intangible and aesthetic values’ such as ‘loss and 
grief’, which can generate just as much animosity as any economic, or other 
instrumental, motivation.100 Space for ‘loss and grief’, and the resulting 
responses of animosity, ought to be found in regimes based on democratic 
pragmatism. But even here non-instrumental (affective, belief and traditional) 
values and interests are all too often silenced by the dominant economic and 
administrative rationalism. 
One way of dealing with animosity that is grounded in non-instrumental values 
and interests is to dismiss it as misinformed. In the UK, developers frame their 
interactions with the public using an ‘information deficit model’, preferring to 
engage with the public through ‘exhibitions’ rather than ‘public-meetings.’101 It 
is assumed that most, if not all opposition can be dispelled by a programme of 
myth-busting. The constant presentation by policy makers and developers to 
‘not-in-my backyard –NIMBYs’ as deviant minorities102 is, some argue, 
unsubstantiated and deliberately designed to render them something to be 
                                            
99  Interview F23Y. It is reported that one civil society actor, having failed to rouse 
enthusiasm in Cyprus, is complaining to Brussels about the breach of conditions by one 
developer to protect birdlife: Interview K26C. 
100  Cass and Walker op. cit. n. 89 p.64. 
101  Id. p. 67. 
102  J. Swofford and M. Slattery ‘Public attitudes to wind energy in Texas: Local 
communities in close proximity to wind farms and their effect on decision-making’ (2010) 38 
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‘overcome’, in particular by improving levels of ‘trust’ in developers.103 
Likewise the only information available on the website of the Cyprus Wind 
Energy Association is a leaflet on the ‘myths’ and ‘truths’ about wind farms, 
and developers referred to holding ‘a public presentation’ with ‘maps, 
photographs, examples of other places’. ‘We have to explain to people, 
although sometimes people are not ready to understand.’ ‘It doesn’t cost them 
anything to say all the nonsense in the world.  They don’t have to prove it.’ ‘All 
these monsters that people are dreaming of, they don’t exist.’104  
A second method of dealing with animosity grounded in non-instrumental 
values and interest is to dismiss it as irrational and, therefore, irrelevant to the 
participation-based regime in question. Developers in the UK have been 
found refer to animosity among project-affected residents as ‘gut’, ‘visceral’, 
‘passionate’ or ‘angry’ and, therefore, irrelevant.105 In Cyprus, developers 
reported that it is time consuming but bearable when government actors 
object to a project during the construction license phase—it is to be dealt with 
‘on the statutory level.’ But the objections of local communities are uniquely 
infuriating because they are just ‘a question of opinion’ and ‘then the whole 
thing stops.’ Other typical comments in this vein include: ‘At [Location X] they 
were throwing stones at us’; and ‘That mayor [at location Y] was shouting like 
a mad thing’. 
Thirdly, developers and their advisors in Cyprus regularly dismissed animosity 
expressed in the course of participation-based regimes as a, somehow 
illegitimate, cover for instrumental concerns about the value of land or other 
assets. For example, ‘people will bring out environmental objections in order 
to cover their real fears. Their real fear is the value of the land.’ ‘It’s 
unbelievable what nonsense we heard about the objections [in Location Z], 
even that wind farms will affect the ground water…They were hiding behind 
the environmental things but they were afraid that they will lose a very 
                                            
103  M. Aitken ‘Why we still don’t understand the social aspects of wind power: A critique 
of key assumptions within the literature’ (2010) 38 Energy Policy 1834. 
104  Interviews PC25 and F23Y. For the leaflet see http://cwea.org.cy. 
105  Cass and Walker pp. cit. n. 89 at p.65. 
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lucrative illegal trade of these small birds, ambelopoulia.’ Likewise, when 
anemometers set up by developers in 2007 to measure wind speeds in Agios 
Theodoros were torn down--some say by ‘just ordinary people’, others say by 
property developers or competitors—developers agreed it was because of 
‘fear.’106 One developer present at the scene asked reporters to focus on the 
fact that ‘something like this shows that Cyprus is a country full of risks for 
wind farms’ (thereby scoring another potential point towards CDM 
registration). A second developer reportedly observed that locals were ‘simply 
delaying the inevitable. We are acting perfectly legally, we have all the 
necessary permits and will not be undone. We have done too much and spent 
too much money to stop now.’107 Implicit in these reports is the idea that 
economic or other instrumental concerns were somehow of less weight or 
relevance when held by residents, than when held by developers. 
CONCLUSION 
The approach that I have set out in this paper enables social life of all levels, 
intensities and types (including the economic) to be placed on the same 
analytical page. Empirically, it works from interviews and site visits backed up 
with secondary sources. Analytically, it connects actions and interactions, with 
regimes and rationalities—or as Roger Cotterrell puts it elsewhere in this 
volume, it connects ‘what is embedded’ with ‘in what it is embedded.’  
Normatively, this approach seeks to given equal consideration to the 
perspectives of each set of actors. In so doing it offers a unique combination 
of insights.  
It highlights the rationalities that dominate a given regime--in this case 
economic rationalism and administrative rationalism in Kyoto, and democratic 
pragmatism and administrative rationalism in Aarhus. It also highlights 
mismatches between, on the one hand, the actor worlds envisaged by 
                                            
106  Interviews A27C, F23Y, PC25 and KM25. 
107  Cyprus Mail 27.02.07 reposted at < http://www.wind-
watch.org/newsarchive/2007/02/27/we-have-spent-too-much-money-to-stop-now> accessed 
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administrator-sociologist regime creators, in this case at Kyoto and Aarhus; 
and, on the other hand, real life actions and interactions--in this case 
occurring among developers (markets), engineers and regulators (experts), 
project affected persons and civil society actors (people) in Cyprus.  
So we see that expertise is at the heart of the Kyoto rationality-regime, but it is 
lacking among government actors in Cyprus, that the differently-expert views 
of project-affected residents are excluded, and that the void is filled by the 
expertise of developers.  
We see that civic participation is at the heart of the Aarhus rationality-regime, 
and government enthusiasm is at the heart of the Kyoto rationality-regime. But 
Apatheia (απάθεια)—in the original meaning of detachment--was cherished 
by the Stoics, and one might be forgiven for wondering whether it is so valued 
by civil society and government actors today. 
We see that wind (άηεµος, anemos) is in short supply in Cyprus, but wind 
farms are rather plentiful, thanks in part to enthousiasmos (ενθουσιασµόs)--in 
each of its evolving meanings originally, ecstasy arising from possession by 
God, then over-confidence arising from the delusion that one is inspired by 
God, then extremism and finally, plain old positive feelings—emanating from 
carbon market creators in Brussels and Bonn.  
The concerns of residents affected by wind farms are mere frippery as 
compared to the threats of flooding and famine that are faced by others 
elsewhere and that are ascribed to the use of fossil fuels. But this observation 
does not dull the significance of the insights set out in this paper. For the 
extent to which extent carbon avoidance and sustainable development result 
from CDM registered projects, whose local support and approval are intended 
to be aided by the international imprimatur of the UN, is also wide open to 
scientific question.108 So the balancing of local values and interests remains 
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an honourable and reasonable task, and one well suited to exploration 
through an economic sociology of law. 
